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Abstract
The paper examines the role of policy intervention in catalyzing institutional change. We show
that rst order changes in the political structure (e.g. introduction of democracy) may be under-
mined by local political interests and result in persistence in institutions and the (poor) quality
of governance. The paper identies two e¤ects of development policy as a tool for institutional
change. One, by increasing political accountability, it may encourage nascent democratic govern-
ments to invest in good institutions the incentive e¤ect. However, we show that it also increases
the incentive of the rentier elite to tighten their grip on political institutions the political control
e¤ect. Which of these dominate determine the overall impact on institutional quality. Under
some conditions, by getting the elite to align their economic interests with that of the majority,
development policy can lead to democratic consolidation and economic improvement. However if
the elite are deeply entrenched, then comprehensive change may require combining development
policy with subsidies for the elite to modernize.
1 Introduction
Much of the recent literature has emphasized the importance of institutions and good governance
for long term development.1 However, the adoption of new institutions has had a rather mixed
record. For example, the introduction of democratic institutions has failed to deliver a sustained
improvement in economic outcomes in many developing countries. 2 Indeed, even within demo-
cratic countries such as India and Mexico and much of the Americas, there are large di¤erences in
the quality of economic institutions across regions.3 In this context, we ask when does the adop-
tion of democratic institutions improve economic institutions and when may they get subverted by
entrenched interests? In addressing this question, we also throw light on the role of development
policy in catalyzing positive economic and political change.
We develop a model in which economic institutions such as the degree of property rights
protection, enforcement of contracts etc. are inuenced by the governments policy choices and
deliberate e¤ort at improving such institutions within the region. While most countries have
a federal constitution and legal system, local governments often have considerable authority in
formulating local laws or at least in their enforcement. Through their allocation (or not) of
resources towards these areas of governance, the government in power can have a signicant
impact on the quality of economic institutions that get realized, and consequently on investment
and welfare in the region. Our focus is then on the forces that a¤ect the governments decision-
making on this important dimension. In our framework, there are two groups in this region,
with the majority group consisting primarily of wage-earners who are relatively poor. These wage
earners stand to benet from better economic institutions attracting increased investment into the
region, thereby resulting in a rise in their wages. The other group is an economic elitethat enjoys
monopoly rents in the current (backward) institutional structure. Any change/improvement to the
existing institutional set-up that may encourage other entrepreneurs to invest is likely to adversely
1See for example, Hall and Jones (1999), Rodrik, Subramaniam and Trebbi (2004), and Acemoglu, Johnson and
Robinson (2005).
2See for example, Barro (1997), Rodrik (1999), Mulligan, Gil, and Sala-i-Martin (2004). In Latin America,
according to the 2003 Latinobarometro poll, 15 of 18 countries witnessed a signicant erosion of support for democracy
with over a third of the population classied as dissatised democrats. Over 71% of the respondents felt that
democracy had been captured by special interests. Similar results are also observed in the Eastern Europe barometer.
3Dash and Raja (2009) document big di¤erences in indices of institutional quality they construct across Indian
states. On a scale from -5 to +5, for the property rights index, they nd that the measures range from a worst of
-2.68 to a best of 5. Similarly, Acemoglu and Dell (2010) document nd that (for the Americas) within-country
di¤erences in labor income are larger than di¤erences across countries, and a signicant portion of this disparity
can be attributed to institutional di¤erences at the sub-national level.
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a¤ect these rents earned by the minority elite. It is this potential for an adverse distributional
outcome that underlies the elites desire to control the political levers of government.
These two groups with conicting interests seek to inuence government policy with respect
to economic institutions such as property rights. The citizens voice their favor or disfavor of the
government at the polls by either re-electing or ousting an incumbent. In contrast, the traditional
elite directly inuence governmental decision-making through the o¤er of bribes in exchange for
the government implementing their preferred outcome, namely that of a low level of property rights
protection. Whether in fact the elite can do so successfully depends on the nature of the regions
economic and political fundamentals. We show that for a region plagued with weak economic
fundamentals or riveted by conict on non-economic issues, elections do not provide enough of a
reward for a democratic government to escape the clutches of inuence by the elite. Thus despite
free and regular elections, democracy remains imperfect as government policy remains captured
by the economic elite. As a result, economic institutions remain dysfunctional and income for the
majority remains low.
For a region stuck with such ine¢ cient institutions, intervention by a policymaker who is
external to the region or country provides the prospect of institutional change and economic
improvement within a shorter time frame.4 Consider for instance, a development policy which
encourages investment in a region, be it through investment in infrastructure (thereby reducing the
cost of doing business there), or by tax-breaks and subsidies for those whose invest in the region.
We identify two channels through which such a policy can impact both political and economic
institutions in the region. The rst is what we call the incentive e¤ect of development policy. We
show that by raising accountability and rewarding good governance, such a policy encourages the
government to strengthen economic institutions and improve property rights. Indeed by doing so
the government also simultaneously improves the strength of its political institutions. However,
there is also a second e¤ect at work. In particular, by encouraging outside investment, development
policy gives rise to the spectre of a large loss in economic rents by the elite. This prospect
of an erosion in economic rents gives the elite greater incentive to tighten its grip and deploy
additional resources to control the levers of government. Through this channel of a political control
e¤ect, development policy may therefore also have the adverse e¤ect of potentially undermining
political institutions.5 This double-edged aspect of policy intervention is worth emphasizing. In
4This formulation captures a number of plausible scenarios. For instance, this externalpolicymaker may be the
federal government attempting to improve both the quality of economic institutions and democracy in a backward
province. Alternately, it could be a country or an international agency such as the U.N. confronting the task of
transforming institutions in Afghanistan or East Timor.
5 In Mexico, Fox (1994) cites the case of development policy in the Mihoacan province. This increased political
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our model, under some conditions the incentive e¤ect is strong enough to ensure that development
policy results in not just better protection of property rights, but also transforms democracy by
freeing government policy-making from the elitesgrip. However, when the political control e¤ect
outweighs the incentive e¤ect, a benign development policy can backre by resulting in an overall
deterioration in governance and the quality of the economic institutions. This result thus provides
an important cautionary note in the use of development policy as a tool to transform institutions.
In an extension of the basic model, we show that development policy may also have the
secondary e¤ect of prompting the elite to change their technology closer to the frontier so as
to be less dependent on an insular institutional setup for their prots. Thus it may lead to
modernization indirectly. If however the elites are deeply entrenched, in that their traditional
technology is very far from the technological frontier or the costs of reorganization for them are
too large, development policy is unlikely to erode their political controlof government. In such
cases, democratic elections may need to be combined with developmental policy and subsidies to
the elite in order to bring about comprehensive institutional change in the region.
Related literature: Our paper is clearly related to much of the recent work on the adoption and
di¤usion of democracy. This literature has emphasized that the adoption of democracy has come
from the threat of revolution by the disenfranchised majority (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2000), the
elitesaim of improving welfare by reducing the space for narrow redistributive political compe-
tition (Lizzeri and Persico, 2004), and the role of economic cleavages and group formation within
the elite (Llavador and Oxoby, 2005). This positive analysis of voluntary elite-led democratization
is clearly important in enhancing our understanding of the sources of the spread of democracy.
However, especially since World War II, there have been many instances where the spur to democ-
racy has been from direct and indirect forms of external inuence. Such projects of institutional
engineering has had mixed results. On the one end we have successes such as Japan, Germany and
East Timor while on other end we have notable failures such as Somalia and Haiti (see Dobbins
et. al., 2007 for a discussion). Attempts at spreading democratization and better institutions in
backward regions of countries such as Brazil, Mexico and India have also had limited success. In
this paper we take a rst step in exploring the e¤ects of policies aimed at bringing about com-
prehensive institutional change. The closest paper to ours is Acemoglu and Robinson (2008), who
also explore conditions under which the introduction of democracy need not result in an improve-
ment in economic institutions. Similarly, Acemoglu and Robinson (2000) look at conditions under
participation of the individuals native to the region. At the same time, cases of election malpractice and booth
capturing by the landed elite also dramatically increased.
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which elites would seek to prevent development from occurring. While our analysis also derives
conditions under which democracy is e¤ectively captured by the elite, our focus is on the impact of
di¤erent policies that can help mitigate or exacerbate this problem and their interaction with the
local conditions, thereby helping understand which policies are more likely to succeed under what
conditions. Finally, Myerson (2006, 2009) stresses the importance of building political institutions
to encourage political competition for democracy to succeed. By focusing on economic policies,
our paper is thus complementary to this work.
Our analysis is also related to the literature examining the relationship between institutional
structure and political accountability. This literature explores the e¤ect of di¤erent institutional
setups (e.g. democracies versus autocracies (Persson and Tabellini, 2000), the size of the base of
political power (de Mesquita et al., 2003)) on political accountability, economic policies and other
related phenomena. While related to this literature, our contribution also explores the e¤ect of
political accountability on the institutional structure itself and how changes in one can (or cannot)
bring about changes in the other. In line with recent work by Besley (2005), our framework also
emphasizes the importance of political selection and leadership for good governance. Our paper
emphasizes that in imperfect democracies, political selection is constrained and high quality leaders
may be prevented from emerging, despite free and fair elections.
Finally, our paper is related to issues of corruption and lobbying in countries with relatively
weak institutions. The recent literature on corruption has been surveyed by Mishra (2005) and
Olken and Pande (2012). We share with this literature the focus on incentives to indulge in an
e¢ ciency-reducing action/policy. Our framework is also related to the literature on lobbying (e.g.
Grossman and Helpman, 2001), but since we have only one group lobbying, our model avoids the
intricacies involved with multiple lobby groups. The relationship between development, lobbying
and corruption is described in Harstad and Svensson (2011).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we describe the basic model of
the political process, and characterize its e¤ect on institutions, and consequently on the economy.
Section 3 describes the model in the context of landowning elites, and analyzes their incentives to
modernize in response to various interventionist policies, while Section 4 concludes.
2 Description of the Model
We begin by outlining a simple model of government capture and its e¤ect on underlying institu-
tions.
Investors in a particular region/province P fear that their output or returns from investment
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may get appropriated or stolen. Thus, factors such as the e¤ectiveness of institutions to enforce
property rights, the e¢ cacy of the administrative machinery, and the law and order situation in
the region in crucial to their decision on whether or not to invest in this province. Now, the quality
of these factors can be heavily inuenced by initiatives taken (or not) by the regional government.
For example, while the constitutional law maybe the same across a country, the intensity of its
implementation may vary widely across regions, depending on investment by the government in
building state capacityin the form of hiring inspectors, judicial o¢ cers, police etc. and basically
taking the initiative to promote a climate where legal contracts are honored.
Policies: For simplicity we assume that there are two possible levels of protection: 0 or p: This
gives the probability that a particular investor can reap the complete returns from his or her
investment. Thus, a 0 level of protection represents a regime without any signicant property
rights protection, and which is unlikely to attract much investment.
The level of protection in a province is assumed to be a function of the governments ability,
resources devoted and experience in such matters of e¤ective governance. Specically, we assume
that the level of protection in a province is
p with probability a(e+ xy); and is 0 otherwise.
Here, a is the governments ability at enforcing law and order (or property rights) and is assumed
to be one of two values: either high ability H, or low ability L = 0. Similarly, e represents the
governments e¤orts/resources devoted on the law and order front, and can either be 0 or 1: Thus,
e = 1 represents the governments initiative in enforcing a good investment climate in the province,
and is a policy choice by the incumbent regional government. However, doing so is costly, and we
assume that the cost of implementing e = 1 is given by (with an abuse of notation) e:6
In the above production structure, x denotes the value of experience at governance matters,
and is acquired only by putting in high e¤ort (i.e. e = 1) at governance; if the government puts
in no e¤ort, then x = 0: The years of experience in o¢ ce is denoted by y. We assume that a
government can be in o¢ ce for at most two terms; thus y = 0 for new governments, and y = 1 for
governments who get reelected for a second term.
Thus in this particular set-up, only high ability governments can bring about a good invest-
ment climate, either by putting in the requisite e¤ort, or by virtue of their experience at good
governance. For simplicity, low ability governments (L = 0) are always assumed to be ine¤ective.
6The level of property rights protection is modelled here as being probabilistic. Alternately, one could consider
as there being two possible levels of protection regime: high or low, with government policy playing a big role (along
with other random factors) in determining which regime gets implemented.
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It is worthwhile to note that in the above structure, if a high ability government puts in e¤ort
e = 1 during its rst term of o¢ ce and is then reelected, the e¤ects of good governance persists
to some degree during its second term as well (even if the government puts in e = 0 during that
term). The parameter x thus also represents the degree of persistence in this process.
Investment: Investment into this region is dependent on the level of protection that exists
for investors. If the level of protection is 0; then returns to all investors get appropriated with
probability 1; and thus no investment is attracted. This is a situation where there is no respect
for private property. On the other hand, if the level of protection is p; then whether or not
investors nd investing in this province attractive depends on their investment returns, what other
opportunities are available for them, and what are the costs and hassles (e.g. administrative red-
tape) of investing here. We summarize all of this by a parameter  which gives the probability that
investment occurs in this province if the level of protection is p: This parameter can be inuenced
by the federal government or by external powers either through tax or subsidy schemes for agents
choosing to invest in the region, or through infrastructure and other development projects that may
reduce the cost of investing in this region. While in a latter section, we delineate the e¤ect of these
various types of policies on  by deriving this probability from an explicit model of investment,
currently we will take it as a parameter of the model, and examine its comparative static e¤ects
on political and economic institutions in the region.
While potential investors into the region can observe the level of protection and thus infer the
investment climate in the province, ordinary citizens are unable to judge the nitty-gritty details of
the overall level of security. However, by observing whether or not investors have decided to put
down their capital in the province, citizens can infer the level of property rights protection, and
thereby judge the ability and policies adopted by the incumbent government (note that investment
occurs only if the level of protection is p; which itself is possible only when the government is of
high ability and either puts in resources into law and order or is experienced enough in matters
of good governance).
Political Structure: Although it may be a region with poorly developed property rights, we
assume that this province is part of a larger nation in which the basic structure of democracy,
namely regular elections, gets implemented. As is often observed in developing countries, while
the central government may not be able to directly yield inuence over the day to day activities
of provincial governments, it may at least be forceful enough to uphold the conduct of regular
elections. We will thus assume that elections at the regional level get conducted at xed time
intervals. At the end of every period, the incumbent government comes up for re-election at which
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stage it faces a randomly drawn challenger in an election and the regional electorate may decide
to retain it or choose a new government into power. As mentioned earlier, we further assume that
each government can remain in power for at most 2 periods.
The political structure here is simple and focuses on the incumbent governments desire to
maximize its overall rents. These rents could be those from remaining in o¢ ce, which are assumed
to be R; or from payo¤s that interested agents may pay the government in order to inuence its
policies. In addition to the actual salary, R is also meant to capture the prestige and other (legal)
perks enjoyed from holding o¢ ce.
The electorate here consists of identical agents whose objective is to choose the government
that is most likely to gain them the maximum welfare. The majority of the electorate are wage-
earners who benet from investment occurring in the region. Since the chances of this happening
are higher with a high ability government in power, they would like to choose a government who
is more likely to be of ability H: While citizens cannot directly tell the ability of the government
in power, they can infer it from their observations about whether or not investment has occurred
in the region.
All incumbents are assumed to be ex-ante identical, and that with probability h it is of high
ability, and with probability 1  h that of low ability. Governance being a complex, multi-faceted
task, this is also assumed to be unknown to the government itself. Thus, the structure here is that
of a career-concerns framework (e.g. Holmstrom, 1982, Majumdar, Mani and Mukand, 2004)7, in
which an increased allocation of resources, by raising the chances of a higher output, can skew
the voters perception of government competence in its favor and thus enhance the governments
chances of re-election.
We make the following assumption on the experience factor x:
Assumption 1: x > h
This ensures that proven high ability incumbents are preferred to unproven challengers, and
thus get re-elected into their second term in o¢ ce, even though it is anticipated that it being their
last term, they will then choose e¤ort e = 0:
Politics can sometimes also get dominated by non-economic issues such as ethnic, religious
and social discord. The salience of such issues can di¤er widely among regions in a country,
depending on the distributional make-up of the region and its history. We model the prevalence
of non-economic issues in politics in a simple manner by assuming that in each election, with
7Persson and Tabellini (2000, Chapter 4) provide a useful overview of the relevance of a career concerns framework
to address political economy issues. From a technical viewpoint, this assumption of the true ability a being not
known ex-ante by the incumbent, avoids signaling issues in the model.
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probability "; politics is determined solely by economic issues as described above (i.e. voters care
only about the economic ability of government), while with probability 1  "; it is dominated by
non-economic issues. In the latter case, the chances of re-election for the incumbent government,
irrespective of its economic performance, is given (exogenously) by : Thus, regions with a low
" are those in which economic issues take a back-seat to other orthogonal issues in determining
electoral outcomes. Which particular issue is salient for the current election is only determined
just prior to the election; thus it is not known to the government at the time of making its decision
with respect to investing e (or not) in property rights protection.
Traditional Elite: While investment in the province improves employment opportunities, and
thus welfare, of the majority of citizens in the province, there are some whose traditional rents
may be imperiled. We term this (small) group as elites. For example, this could be a group
who hold monopoly power in some sectors of the provincial economy and may see their monopoly
rents get eroded in the face of competition. They could also be a group who make heavy use of
a labor-intensive technology in their production and thus their prots would fall if wages were
to go up in the economy due to a greater demand for labor stemming from increased investment
in the region. Per se these provincial elite, either by virtue of their information or enforcement
advantage, do not require state-enforced protection to operate, and would thus like to maintain
the current status-quo of a low level of property rights which dissuades outside investors from
investing in the province.
These traditional elite would thus like to inuence the government to not devote resources into
property right protection, thereby enabling them to maintain their monopoly hold. We model the
inuence game in a simple manner. All elite are assumed to be identical and together lose rents
M if outside investment occurs in the province. Thus they would be interested in paying a bribe
b to the government to prevent it from enforcing a regime of good property rights protection. We
assume that the elites are organized into a lobby group that takes into account the gains and
losses of all the elites in deciding how much total bribe to o¤er to the government. The elites are
assumed to be innitely lived, and discount each electoral period by a factor :
Here, we have directly assumed that there is a conict of interest vis-a-vis property rights
protection between the elites and the majority of citizens in the province. However, this need not
not always be the case. For example, better protection of property rights can lead to outsiders
being more willing to bring advanced technology to the province, and which may be of benet to
the elite as well, say by complementing the present production technology of the elite. Although
most of our analysis does not consider this possibility explicitly, this can be incorporated into
the model by considering the case of M (the elites rents) being negative from the government
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choosing a policy of e = 0 that will discourage outside investors from entering the province.
This particular political framework, which involves a dynamic game between the politician, the
citizen-workers and also the eliteslobby, is similar to the structure in Coate and Morris (1999),
who use it to study the adoption and persistence of policies.
2.1 Equilibrium:
In the above political structure, there are two groups of agents who seek to inuence policies
adopted by the government. One is the citizens, who voice their favor or disfavor of the government
at the polls by either re-electing or ousting an incumbent. On the other hand are the traditional
elite, whose lobby seeks to directly inuence governmental decisions through the o¤er of bribes in
exchange for the government implementing their preferred outcome, namely that of a low level of
property rights protection. The government, in making its decision of whether or not to put in
e¤ort e = 1 into law and order and property rights enforcement weighs the potential benets that
the two groups o¤er.
We focus on Markov perfect equilibria (MPE) for the game, where the state of the world s
in any period consists of whether the government in power is one which has been re-elected from
the previous or is newly in power. A MPE here consists of strategies b(s) for the eliteslobby on
how much bribe to o¤er to the government for implementing a policy of e = 0; the governments
strategy on what bribes to accept and what to reject (associated with the decision e(s) on whether
or not to put in e¤ort), and the citizensvoting strategy v(s) as a function of their observation on
whether or not investment occured in the province. A strategy prole (b; e; v) is a (Markov-perfect)
equilibrium if, after any history, each players strategy under the prole is optimal, given that he
expects all other players to use their equilibrium strategies.
Consider a government in its second (and nal) term in o¢ ce. Given that it is its last period
in o¢ ce, it will put in e¤ort e = 0: Hence if this government is of high ability and chose e = 1
in the rst period, then the probability of a high level of protection this period is Hx: The more
interesting part of the analysis is the decision-making in the rst period i.e. when a new government
has just assumed o¢ ce. This is what we study now.
Consider the decision of the citizen-workers (who form the majority of the electorate) in the
event when the election is determined only by economic issues. If they observe investment occurring
in the province, they infer that the level of protection must be p; and therefore the government
must be one of high ability who has put in e¤ort e = 1. Reelecting such a government means that
the probability of a high level of protection in the next period is Hx; while that from electing a
random challenger is Hh; since x > h; the electorate will thus reelect any government that is able
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to demonstrate competence by bringing in investment.
From a new governments perspective, if it does in put in e¤ort e = 1; then with probability
qinv = Hh investment occurs, and then if economic issues dominate the election, it is re-elected
for a second term during which it earns rents R: If non-economic issues are salient, its probability
of being reelected is : Thus, its payo¤ from putting in high e¤ort is ("qinv + (1  "))R  e: We
assume that e is small enough so that this value is positive.
On the other hand, if it accepts a bribe b from the traditional elite and puts in no e¤ort into
property rights protection, then the level of protection is 0; no investment comes in and it gets
ousted from power in the event that the election is determined by economic issues. The di¤erence
between the two payo¤s gives the minimum bribe level that is required for the government to be
inuenced into adopting a policy of no protection, and is given by bmin = "qinvR  e:
From the elitesperspective, if they do not o¤er a bribe to the new government, it will put in
resources into property rights protection, and therefore with probability qinv investment will occur
and it will lose its monopoly rents M: Thus, the elitespayo¤ from o¤ering no bribe is given by:
Wno bribe = (1  qinv)M + ("qinv + (1  "))f(1  Hx)M + 2Wnewg
+(1  ["qinv + (1  ")])Wnew
where Wnew is the value (to the elite) of having a new, untried government in power. The rst
term on the right-hand captures the retention of rents M if outside investment does not occur,
while the second and third terms capture respectively the payo¤s for the elite in the case that
the current government is re-elected and when it is not. In the event that investment does occur,
the elite not only lose their rents this period, but also the proven high ability government gets
re-elected for a second term, during which it cannot be inuenced by the elite. The dynamic
structure of the model brings this second e¤ect into consideration, and as we show below, will
inuence the overall impact of a better investment climate on incentives for the government in
devoting resources into property rights protection.
If the elite o¤er a bribe which the incumbent accepts and in return chooses e¤ort e = 0 on law
and order, then the overall payo¤ for the elite, gross of the bribe paid, is given by:
Wbribe = M + (1  ")fM + 2Wnewg+ ("+ (1  ")(1  ))Wnew
Now the elite retain their monopoly rents M for sure, while as before, the second and third terms
give their payo¤s when the government is reelected (on non-economic issues) and when it is not,
respectively.
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Thus, from the elitesperspective, the di¤erence between inuencing the government and not
is given by:
D = Wbribe  Wno bribe (1)
= (1  ")qinvM + HxM("qinv + (1  ")) + "qinv(1  )Wnew
Therefore, the maximum bribe that the elite will be willing to pay is bmax = D:
Let us consider a stationary equilibrium of the game in which the elite pay a xed bribe b to the
government every period, and in return the government does not put in e¤ort into property rights
enforcement, no investment occurs and therefore in every election that is determined by economic
considerations alone, a new government gets elected to power replacing the current incumbent.
We consider conditions under which this can be an equilibrium of the game. The set-up here is of
a short lived agent, namely the incumbent government, playing against a long-lived opponent, the
innitely-lived elite. In this framework, both are in a situation of bilateral monopoly, and clearly
the bargaining protocol will determine the split of the surplus between the two. We are however
interested in seeing whether the maximum that one player is willing to pay is enough to inuence
the action of the other (as in Coate and Morris, 1999) i.e. whether the maximum bribe that the
elite are willing to pay, bmax; is larger than the minimum that the government is willing to accept,
bmin; so that under any reasonable bargaining protocol, the two will agree to this bargain, and thus
implement the policy e = 0 (thus resulting in a low level of property rights and thereby ensuring
the perpetuation of monopoly rents for the elite).
In this stationary equilibrium, the elite get rents M every period and need to pay a bribe b to
each new government. With probability "+ (1  ")(1  ); the government is ousted at the next
election and is replaced by a new government. On the other hand, if the election is dominated by
non-economic issues and the government is retained, the low property-rights regime continues to
the next period and a fresh new government comes into power only in the period after. Thus in
this stationary equilibrium, the value to the elite from a new government in power is given by:
Wnew = M   b+ ("+ (1  ")(1  ))Wnew + (1  ")fM + 2Wnewg
) Wnew = M   b+ (1  ")M
(1  )(1 + (1  ")) :
Inserting this into (1) gives the expression for the maximum level of bribe that the elite would be
willing to pay in a stationary equilibrium with persistent bribing:
bmax = Mfqinv + Hx("qinv + (1  "))g 1 + (1  ")
1 + (1  ") + "qinv (2)
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This stationary equilibrium is therefore sustainable whenever this maximum willingness to pay
by the elite exceeds the minimum level of bribe bmin that is required to inuence the incumbent
government to adopt a policy of e = 0: This is summarized in the proposition below.
Proposition 1 The government is inuenceable and thus no protection/enforcement of property
rights takes place if the following condition holds:
bmin = "qinvR  e Mfqinv + Hx("qinv + (1  "))g 1 + (1  ")
1 + (1  ") + "qinv = b
max (3)
In this case, democracy is e¤ectively captured by the elite. If condition (3) does not hold, then
democracy works in the sense that the stationary equilibrium involves the government putting in
e¤ort into e¤ective property rights protection.
When the condition (3) is not satised, the above proposition shows that the stationary equi-
librium cannot involve e = 0: To show that in this case the equilibrium involves no bribing and
e¤ective governance i.e. e = 1; we need to establish that the elite do not have an incentive to
deviate by o¤ering a large enough bribe to inuence the government.
For a given future value of having a new government in power Wnew; the maximum incentive
for the elite to bribe the government is still given by the condition (1). However, in a stationary
equilibrium involving e = 1; the value of having a new government in power W 1new is now given
by:
W 1new = (1  qinv)M + ("qinv + (1  "))f(1  Hx)M + 2W 1newg+ (1  ("qinv + (1  ")))W 1new
) W 1new =
Mf1  qinv + (1  ")g
(1  )(1 + (1  ") + "qinv)
Inserting W 1new into (1) gives the maximum bribing willingness for the elite in this case as:
bmax1 = (1  ")qinvM + HxM("qinv + (1  ")) + "qinv
Mf1  qinv + (1  ")g
1 + (1  ") + "qinv
= Mfqinv + Hx("qinv + (1  "))g 1 + (1  ")
1 + (1  ") + "qinv
which is the same as given by (2). Thus the stationary equilibrium will involve no bribing and e = 1
only when the elite do not have an incentive to deviate from this strategy i.e. when bmax1 < b
min;
which is precisely the case when (3) does not hold. Hence condition (3) exactly delineates the set
of parameters under which the stationary equilibrium involves e = 0; and in the complementary
set, the equilibrium involves e = 1: In the latter case, democracy works in the sense that all
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governments put in e¤ort towards good governance and there is a high probablity of investment
occuring resulting in gains for the general populace.
The above proposition gives the condition under which even though decision-making rests
formally in the hands of a democratically elected government, the process is e¤ectively controlled by
the elite, resulting in a low level of property rights protection and consequently a low level of outside
investment and low welfare for the masses in the province. We are interested in analyzing the role
of the di¤erent parameters on this condition of government-captureand thereby understanding
the e¤ects of di¤erent policies on it.
Investment promoting policies: Consider the e¤ects of an investment-promoting policy for this
region, for example by bettering the infrastructure or more directly by reducing the cost of invest-
ment through subsidies, tax-breaks or other incentives for investors.8 In the context of the present
model, consider an increase in ; the probability that investment occurs when there is protection
for property rights in the province. Firstly, it has the e¤ect of rewarding good governance. As 
rises, the probability of investment in the presence of e¤ective property rights increases. Since the
government gets re-elected when the electorate perceives the benets of better protection through
increased investment, this increases the governments incentive in putting in e¤ort e = 1 (due to
a higher chance of getting reelected). Thus bmin rises. At the same time however, the elite too
fear the increased chance of their monopoly rents getting eroded due to the increased possibility
of investment occurring. Thus, the bribe they are willing to pay, bmax; also rises. The following
corollary to proposition 1 determines which of these two e¤ects dominate.
Corollary 1 There exists 1; 2 2 (0; 1]; with 1 < 2 such that for  < 1 and for  > 2;
bmin > bmax; and therefore the elite e¤ectively bribing the government to implement e = 0 is a
stationary equilibrium of the game. For  2 [1; 2]; democracy works to provide enough incentive
to the government to put in e¤ort e = 1:
Proof. Let us rewrite the condition for e¤ective bribing (3) as (with qinv = Hh):
"R  e
Hh
+M(1 + (1  "))1 + ("Hx+ (1  ")
x
h)
1 + (1  ") + "Hh (4)
When  = 0; the right-hand side of the above inequality is innite and thus exceeds the left-
hand side. By continuity, when  (which is a measure of the rewards to good governance) is close
8We assume that (i) the policymaker implementing this policy is externalto the regional political game, and
(ii) the policy change is unanticipated, so that the equilibrium of the regional political game before the policy gets
implemented is not a¤ected. Assumption (ii) can be relaxed to some degree but at the expense of notational and
computational complexity.
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to 0; the e¤ective returns to e¤ort for the government is very low. In such cases, the elite can o¤er
a large enough bribe to inuence the government.
The derivative of the right-hand side of the inequality with respect to  is given by:
  e
2Hh
+
M(1 + (1  "))"H(x  h)
[1 + (1  ") + "Hh]2
This is negative at  close to 0; and then (since x > h by assumption 1) changes sign and becomes
positive beyond a certain level of  i.e. the right-hand side of (4) is U-shaped in ; as shown in
gure (??). Thus, either for very small or very large values of  does the right-hand side of (4)
exceed "R; and thus only in those regions does the equilibrium involve e¤ective bribing by the
elite.
A change in the probability  of attracting investment through improved property rights protec-
tion has two e¤ects. One, by making governmental e¤ort more visible, it rewards good governance
(by raising the chances of getting reelected) and thus increases the incumbent governments incen-
tive of putting in e¤ort e = 1: This is the incentive e¤ect, and serves to reduce the moral hazard
problem inherent in the political set-up.
At the same time, by raising the chances of a government of high ability (who has put in
e¤ort e = 1) being re-elected, an increase in  serves to also raise the e¢ cacy of the system
in re-electing able governments. Due to their experience factor x; (under assumption 1) the
probability of continuing with a regime with good property rights is higher for reelected high-
ability governments than a randomly chosen new government. This could be due to persistence
in the type of framework that has already been put in place by such a government during its rst
term in o¢ ce, which maybe linked to the type of bureaucrats and other administrative setup that
it may have chosen to enforce good property rights in the rst place. As  increases, this fear of
the increased chances of re-election of a high ability uninuenceable government causes the elite
to raise their bribe. The elite seek to prevent the political game from proceeding to the second
period, where it would be beyond their sphere of inuence. This is the political control e¤ect, and
serves to raise bmax:
As the above corollary shows, the incentive e¤ect dominates for low values of ; while the
political control e¤ect becomes more prominent for high values of : Thus for a province that is
initially not an investment-attracting region i.e. one with a very low  (i.e. below 1) any policy
that lowers the cost of investment or increases the gains from investment i.e. by raising ; can
serve to improve matters by changing the equilibrium from one with persistent bribing and no
property rights to one where the government is uninuenced by the traditional elite and makes
a concerted e¤ort e = 1 to improve investor protection. When  is very small, the visibility of
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government policies towards protecting the rights of investors is extremely limited and this sharply
limits the governments incentive at expending e¤ort towards such policies. By raising incentives,
an increase in  over this range has a positive e¤ect on governance and citizens welfare.
On the other hand, for provinces with a relatively high level of  (i.e. close to but below 2);
a rise in  can sometimes have an adverse e¤ect on a previously well-functioning political system.
While increases in  raises incentives of the government to put in e¤ort e = 1 here too, at the same
time it also raises the elitesfear that high ability governments beyond their sphere of inuence
are more likely to get recognized and thus re-elected by the electorate. This causes an increase
in the bribe that the elite are willing to pay to prevent the recognition of such governments.9 At
such ranges, the political control e¤ect dominates, and thus any policy initiative that pushes 
beyond 2 can change the equilibrium from one where governments are uninuenced and put in
e¤ort e = 1 to one where the elites are willing to pay a high enough bribe to get the government to
put in zero e¤ort into property rights protection. In this case, well-intentioned policy to promote
investment can in fact have a debilitating e¤ect on governance. It thus highlights the importance
of local knowledge (about the e¤ect of ) in implementing policy even by a benevolent external
agency.10
To develop a framework for thinking about specic policies to promote , let us assume that
there are many potential investment opportunities in the province. To develop any of them requires
the investment of k units of capital and  units of labor, while the output from each such project is
valued at I: Thus if the level of protection in the province is p; the expected return from investing
k units of capital there is pI w; where w is the wage level in the province.11 A potential investor
will compare these returns with that from investing elsewhere in making his decision of whether
9 In a related context, Crost and Johnston (2010) nd that in Philippines, the e¤ect of a large development program
KALAHI-CIDSS was to increase conict violence in the areas where this development program was implemented.
10As pointed out earlier, by taking M to be positive we have directly assumed a conict of interest vis-a-vis
property rights protection between the elites and the majority of citizens in the province. However, there can be
cases where better protection of property rights benet both the citizens and the elite. This would be the case where
M is negative.
In this case, both the political control e¤ect and the incentive e¤ect move in the same direction and in fact amplify
each other. The e¤ect of this can be seen from inequality (11). In this case, the right-hand side is always decreasing
in ; implying that the equilibrium will involve e = 0 only for very low values of : Thus, even the lining up of the
citizensand the elitesinterests is not enough to overcome the governments incentive problem only when the initial
probability of investment is very low.
We are grateful to a referee for pointing out this aspect of our analysis.
11Currently we take the wage as given. In the next section, we consider the e¤ects of outside investment on the
wage-rate in the province.
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or not to develop an investment opportunity in the province. Suppose returns to each unit of
capital elsewhere is r: Then investment in this province will occur only if the returns elsewhere is
su¢ ciently low, specically if r  pI wk : Assuming that ex-ante the returns to capital elsewhere
is uniformly distributed over the range [0; U ]; then the probability of investment occurring in this
province in the presence of protection level p is given by:
pI   w
Uk
This thus identies with the parameter  in our analysis so far. In this framework, investment
can be promoted by lowering the capital cost of investment k; which can be done either through
providing a direct subsidy on such investment or by bettering the infrastructure in the province,
thereby lowering the level of k: For example, improvement in power generation and supply can
reduce the need for investors to develop their own private power supply. In terms of their impact
on ; both policies are equivalent, and their choice maybe dictated by cost factors. However, if
dynamic considerations are taken into account, the e¤ect on the equilibrium outcome of improve-
ments in  through a policy of subsidizing investment costs will depend on expectations about
how long such a policy is expected to continue into the future. Furthermore, once the policy is
stopped,  and the equilibrium outcome are likely to return to their previous levels (say below
1). On the other hand, improvements in infrastructure are more likely to be permanent and if it
results in pushing  above 1; is likely to result in a permanent change in the equilibrium outcome
from e = 0 to e = 1: Even though infrastructure improvements maybe more costly, this additional
benet needs to be taken into account in comparing its e¤ectiveness against a policy of direct
subsidy to investors.
What are the e¤ects of the di¤erent characteristics of the regions economic and political
structure that are likely to determine whether it results in an outcome with elite capture or not?
The following corollary to proposition 1 investigates the e¤ect of the various parameters on the
equilibrium.
Corollary 2 The region of elite-capture [0; 1) [ (1;1) shrinks as (i) the rents for the elite,
M; decrease, or (ii) the cost of good governance, e; decreases, or the o¢ cial rents from being in
o¢ ce, R; increase, or (iii) the quality of candidates, h; improves, or (iv) economic factors get
more salient in determining electoral outcomes i.e. " increases, or (v) there is lower persistence
in institutional quality i.e. x falls.
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Proof. Let us rewrite condition (3) as:
R  e
Hh"
+M
1
" + (Hx+
1 "
" 
x
h)
1 + "Hh1+(1 ")
(5)
As determined in the proof of corollary 1; the right-hand side of (5) is U-shaped in ; while the
left-hand side is a constant, as in gure 1. An increase in R raises the left-hand side and has no
e¤ect on the right-hand side. From the gure, it is then clear that this will lower 1 and increase
2; implying that the region where e = 0 shrinks. Similarly, a decrease in e or M or x or an
increase in h or " serves to lower the right-hand side of (5) without a¤ecting the left-hand side;
again, from gure 1, this serves to lower 1 and raise 2; thus shrinking the region of elite-capture.
Not too surprisingly, the above corollary shows that when the costs for an incumbent for
enforcing good governance are low, or the o¢ cial returns from being in o¢ ce, R; are high, resulting
in strong incentive e¤ects, the democratic process is more likely to generate a regime of good
governance. Thus, for example, in regions with a strong history of property right protection, the
incremental initiative required by a new government to ensure their continuation is likely to be
small. As the corollary shows, in such regions, it will be di¢ cult for the elite to capture the
government. Similarly, in regions where the prestige from democratic o¢ ce is high, resulting in
a high R or attracting a pool of good quality candidates for o¢ ce i.e. a high h; the democratic
system should work well in ensuring good governance. This last result complements (although
from a di¤erent perspective) the message of Myerson (2006) who emphasizes the importance of
political competition at the local level in creating a pool of good quality candidates at the national
level.
Conversely, the corollary shows that when non-economic issues dominate the electoral politics,
it is easier for the elite to capture a democratically elected government. Thus, for example, regions
riveted with social or religious conict are more likely to see elites dominating the policy-making
process on the economic front. In such regions, the electoral payo¤ to the government from
investing in bettering economic outcomes for the populace is low, and hence it is not in their
incentive to invest in property right protection and other features of good economic governance.
The corollary also highlights the role of persistence in institutional quality on the outcome. It
is when institutions of good governance are more likely to persist that one is more likely to see
greater elite resistance to their development. In such a case, the elites fear that once developed,
an environment of property rights protection will last signicantly into the future and thus have
a greater incentive to oppose their development in the rst place.
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2.2 Robustness of Basic result
In the model so far, for simplicity, decision-making by a high quality government who is re-
elected for a second term was preordained. Due to the experience factor x; e¤ective property
rights protection was provided with probability Hx; without any policy choice on the part of the
government. Thus, it led to an in-built degree of persistence in the institutional framework, but
only if the incumbent were re-elected. In this section, we explore the robustness of the basic result
by extending the model to allow for the possibility that a second period government can also
choose between the decisions of e2 = 0 or e2 = 1.
The rest of the model is the same, with  being the probability of investment occuring in the
region when the level of protection is p: This protection level is determined by a combination of
the governments ability a and its policy choice e : p occurs with probability ae; and is 0 otherwise.
Governments can be in power for at most two periods, with an election occuring at the end of the
rst period, which with probability " is decided on economic factors. The elites, who are innitely
lived, have a lobby group that can inuence bribes to inuence government decision-making in
each period. We assume that the cost of implementing e2 = 1 in the second period is given by
(with an abuse of notation) e2:
For a re-elected government, the second period is its last period in o¢ ce and thus without any
incentives for the future, it would clearly choose to maximise its income by accepting a bribe. As
is often done in nite-period games, we assume that at this stage, the government cares about
its legacy or track-record in o¢ ce. It receives an additional utility benet Z from having outside
investment occuring in the region (with associated benets for the populace) in both periods of
its governance. This benet could either be a psychological utility of having a positive historical
legacy or the indirect future gains for the electoral party of the government. The rest of the game
is as before.
Again we analyse the game starting from period T = 2 for a re-elected government. This
government could either have been re-elected on economic grounds or on non-economic grounds.
The former would be the case if investment occured at T = 1 and would have been the result
of a high ability government putting in e¤ort into good governance. In this case, the re-elected
government weighs between accepting the elite lobbys bribe b (and choosing e2 = 0) versus
cementing his legacy with continuing good governance. In the latter case, investment occurs with
probability H and thus yields the government a utility level HZ e2: This denes the minimum
bribe level bmin2 that must be o¤ered by the elites at this stage to inuence the governments
decision.
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The maximum level of bribe that the elite are willing to o¤er is their expected loss that period
from the governments decision to implement property rights protection and is given by HM: If
this is less than the minimum bribe level bmin2 ; then in equilibrium, the elites will not be able to
inuence a re-elected high ability government in the second period. We now make the following
assumption (similar to assumption 1) to ensure that this happens, thereby justifying the citizens
decision to re-elect a government under which outside investment happened in period T = 1:
Assumption 2: HZ   e2 > HM
On the other hand, a government who was re-elected on non-economic grounds alone (without
any investment having come in in the rst period) has no incentives to put in e¤ort at implementing
property rights protection in the second period, and thus chooses e2 = 0 even in the absence of
any bribing by the elites.
Moving back to period T = 1; as before, we analyze the maximum willingness of the elites to
bribe, bmax1 ; and the minimum bribe level b
min
1 that the government is willing to accept in order to
determine the region where the government is inuencable.
For a newly elected government, the payo¤ from accepting a bribe b at T = 1 is b+(1 ")R;
as its only chance of getting re-elected is if the election was determined by non-economic factors
alone. On the other hand, implementing property rights e1 = 1 in the rst period gives it a payo¤
of ("qinv +(1 "))R e1+qinv("+(1 "))(HZ e2): This is similar to before, except for the
utility term HZ   e2 which the government may enjoy from a legacy of successful governance in
the second period. The di¤erence between the two gives the minimum bribe level that is required
for the government to be inuenced into adopting a policy of no protection:
bmin1 = qinv["R+ ("+ (1  "))(HZ   e2)]  e1:
For the elites, the maximum willingness can again be derived from their di¤erence in payo¤
between a policy of e1 = 1 versus e1 = 0 in the rst period. This di¤erence results not only from
the di¤erence in payo¤ in that period, but also its consequences for government re-election and
the subsequential impact on second period policy. It is given by12 bmax1 = Wbribe  Wno bribe =
qinvM [1 + (1  ")] + qinv"(1  )Wnew   qinv("+ (1  "))vold (6)
where vold is the elitespayo¤ from having a (re-elected) high ability government in o¢ ce in the
second period and is given by vold = (1  H)M:
12Here,
Wbribe =M   b+ (1  ")fM + Wnewg
+(1  (1  "))Wnew
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In a stationary equilibrium involving persistent bribing b and no property rights protection,
the value of having a new government in power Wnew is given by:
Wnew = M   b+ (1  ")fM + Wnewg+ (1  (1  "))Wnew
) Wnew = Mf1 + (1  ")g   b
(1  )(1 + (1  "))
Using this and (6) gives the maximum bribing willingness for the elite in this case as:
bmax1 = qinvM(1 + (1  "))
1 + H("+ (1  "))
1 + (1  ") + "qinv
Similar to proposition 1 and corollary 1, the following proposition delineates the parameter
range over which the elites can e¤ectively bribe the government to implement a policy of little
protection for property rights. Furthermore, this possibility of capture is maximum at both low
and high values of ; while in the intermediate range, democracy is more likely to succeed.
Proposition 2 In the modied model, no protection/enforcement of property rights takes place if
the following condition holds:
bmin = qinv["R+("+(1 "))(HZ e2)] e1  qinvM(1+(1 "))1 + H("+ (1  "))
1 + (1  ") + "qinv = b
max
(7)
In this case, democracy is e¤ectively captured by the elite. There exists 1; 2 2 (0; 1]; with 1 < 2
such that for  < 1 and for  > 2; the elite e¤ectively bribing the government to implement
e1 = 0 is a stationary equilibrium of the game; for  2 [1; 2]; democracy works to provide enough
incentive to the government to put in e¤ort e1 = 1 and e2 = 1:
Proof. See Appendix.
Thus this proposition establishes that the basic result of the possibility of government capture
when  is either very small or very large holds even in this modied model where the government
has an active role in determining the nature of institutions in the second period of o¢ ce. Again, it
is the result of the incentive e¤ect dominating for low values of ; while the political control e¤ect
becomes more prominent for high values of : In this modied model, a successful government in
the rst period has a much greater incentive (under assumption 2) to enact good property rights
while the value from not bribing is:
Wno bribe = (1  qinv)M + (1  qinv)(1  ")fM + Wnewg
+qinv("+ (1  "))fvnew + Wnewg+ (1  qinv"  (1  "))Wnew
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protection in the second period too. It is fear of this possibility that induces the elite to lobby
even more aggressively a new govenrment in period T = 1:
3 A Model of Landowning Elites
The previous section showed that elites interested in maintaining rents from their traditional
monopolized sectors will attempt to inuence the government into not creating an atmosphere
where competitors are attracted and their rents get eaten away. In this section, we begin by
casting the basic framework into a simple model of landowning elites who use a labor-intensive
technology to reap prots. Such elites desire to keep labor-wages low in order to keep their prots
high. Entry of investors will raise the demand for labor leading to an increase in wages, thereby
eroding prots of the traditional elite. Exploring the model in this framework helps analyze some
additional e¤ects of investment-promoting policies.
Consider E traditional elites who each own one plot of land. They currently use a technology
under which each plot requires l0 units of labor to produce output valued at A: For simplicity
we assume that the labor supply function in this economy is represented by the function L(w);
where w is the wage of each unit of labor. If the only demand for labor is from the land-owning
elites, then the wage is w0 = L 1(El0): If there are other investors who also have a demand for
labor, then wages rise and the general populace (who are wage-earners) gains from it; thus the
electorate would like the government to create an atmosphere where outside investment occurs in
the province. The elites interests are of course diametrically opposite: being dependent on an
labor-intensive technology, their prots diminish when investment occurs and they would thus like
an atmosphere that is inimical to investment.
As before, we assume that for an outside investor to develop any of the many potential in-
vestment opportunities in the province requires the investment of k units of capital and the use
of  units of labor, while the output from the project is valued at I: In making their decision
of whether or not to develop an investment opportunity in the province, potential investors will
compare these returns with that from investing elsewhere
Suppose returns to each unit of capital elsewhere is r; and ex-ante these returns are assumed
to be uniformly distributed over the range [0; U ]: Then for a given realization of r; investment will
occur in this province until the returns get equated with those elsewhere:
(i) [capital arbitrage] pI   w(r)  kr = 0
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where the wage w is determined from the labor supply function:
(ii) [labor market clearing] n+ El0 = L(w)
with n being the number of investment opportunities developed.
Note that the wage in this province in the absence of any outside investment is w0; this is
thus the minimum wage in the province. Investment in this province will occur only if the returns
elsewhere is su¢ ciently low, specically if the net returns at the minimum wage are positive i.e.
pI   w0   kr  0 ) r  rmax = pI w0k : If investment does occur, it will push up wages above
w0 and will thus indicate to the electorate that the investment climate in the province is good
enough to attract investment and so the incumbent government must be one of high ability, and
therefore be rewarded by reelection.
As before, the probability of investment occurring in the presence of protection level p is
pI w0
Uk ; which identies with the parameter  from the previous section. Consequently, from a
new governments perspective, if it does in put in e¤ort e = 1; then with probability qinv = Hh =
Hh(pI w0)
Uk investment occurs, and it is re-elected. For simplicity, here we take " = 1 i.e. economic
issues are always salient in elections.
From the elitesperspective, their total loss in prots conditional on investment occurring is:
El0
Z rmax
0
(w(r)  w0) 1
rmax
dr = El0
pI   w0
2
M
where w(r) is obtained from the capital-arbitrage condition above.13
Thus, this corresponds exactly to the model of the previous section with pI w0Uk being equiva-
lent to  in the abstract model, and El0
pI w0
2 giving the loss in monopoly rents to the elite in the
presence of property rights. Replacing  and M by these expressions in (3) to see whether bmin is
less than bmax thus determines if government policies on property rights are captured by the elite:
R  eUk
Hh(pI   w0) + El0
pI   w0
2
Uk + Hx(pI   w0)
Uk + Hh(pI   w0) (8)
From this condition, it is easy to see that elite capture of government policy-making (resulting
in poor governance) is more likely when elitesinterests are particularly strong, either due to their
13Here, we have assumed that the only e¤ect of outside investment on the elites occurs (negatively) through a
rise in the wage-rate for labor in the province. There can however also be channels through which this e¤ect maybe
positive. For example, outside investment can bring access to modern technology that maybe complementary to the
elitesproduction technology or can introduce greater competition (resulting in lower prices) in a sector that is used
as an input into the elitesproduction. As implied by footnote XX, in such cases the e¤ect of development policy
in lowering  is unambiguously good.
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size E or due to their signicant dependence on labor, as represented by a high l0: As before
(analyzing corollary 1 in this context with  = pI w0Uk ), we see that provinces with very high or
very low investment returns I; and/or very high and very low costs of investment k; are more
prone to capture by the traditional elite. As discussed in the previous section, in the low  region,
this is due to the prevalence of the incentive e¤ect i.e. governments have very low incentives to
take initiatives in bettering institutions; in the high  region, this is due to the dominance of
the political control e¤ect whereby the elitesfear of losing political control translates into a high
willingness on their part at successfully controlling the government.
As before, development policies resulting in an increase in  can result in reducing directly
the chance of government capture through the incentive e¤ect. However, there is an additional
issue that arises here. A higher level of  leads to an increase in bmin; the minimum amount
of bribe that is required to inuence the incumbent government. Thus, the costs to the elite of
controlling the government increase. Recall that it is the elitesdependence on a labor intensive
technology that leads to them fearing a rise in wages and therefore results in their desire to prevent
investment occurring in the province. Suppose there exist alternative technologies which use less
labor, and thus makes the elite less sensitive to increases in the wage-rate. Of course, changing
to such a technology may involve substantial costs both in terms of acquiring the technology as
well as reorganizing the entire production process it may entail. Thus if the elite were sure that
labor wages would remain low, they would have little incentive in incurring the expenses of such
a reorganization. If however the costs of ensuring low wages (through inuencing governmental
policies) increase, would it change their willingness to incur the required reorganization cost to
modernize their technology? This is the question we explore next.
3.1 Modernization by the Elite?
Consider alternative technologies that require less than l0 units of labor per plot of land to produce
output. Adopting a new technology for any plot involves a xed cost F; as well as per unit costs
depending on how di¤erent the new mode of production is from the present one. We assume that
for each plot of land, moving from the current technology of l0 to a labor-saving technology that
uses l1 (l1 < l0) units of labor involves a total cost of F +c(l0  l1)2: As mentioned before, this may
include the cost of actual purchase of machinery, training etc. as well as the cost of reorganization
of the entire production process.
In the absence of any other motive for change, each elite landowner in deciding whether to
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choose a di¤erent technology with lower labor requirement makes the following cost calculation:
max
l1l0
(l0   l1)w0
1     c(l0   l1)
2   F (9)
The rst term is the lifetime savings on labor costs by reducing the labor requirement from l0
to l1; while the latter terms are the costs of reorganization. Given that the current steady state
is l0; it must mean that the costs of reorganization are so high that in the absence of any other
compulsion the elite have no incentive for change. We accordingly make the following assumption
about these costs:
Assumption 2: 4cF (1  )2 > w0
Under this assumption, the value from the maximization in (9) is negative; which means that it
is optimal for the landowner to not modernize in the absence of any other force.
Consider the introduction of an electoral process in the region. This introduction of democratic
elections can occur either due to the regions integration with a larger nation or due to the
intervention and coercive imposition of an electoral process by an external agent, be it the federal
government or a foreign country or an international agency. This external imposition of elections
results in de facto political power moving out of the hands of the elite and to the masses. The
question is whether or not such rst order political intervention results in an improvement in
economic institutions and incomes for the general population.
With the advent of democracy, elites now face the additional burden of costs required to
inuence government policies in order to keep additional investment out and thereby keep wages
at the low level of w0: Is this enough to get the elites to modernize?
Case I : Strong Fundamentals and Democratic Success. Consider rst the case when funda-
mentals are strongin that the underlying infrastructure and economic conditions are relatively
good, and the mere introduction of democracy is su¢ cient to provide elected leaders with the right
incentives. This happens if the minimum bribe required to successfully inuence the government
is beyond what the elite are willing to pay i.e. where the inequality (8) fails to hold so that
bmin > bmax: In this case, governance is no longer captured by the elite and economic institutions
improve. This will be the case when either the mass of elites is small or their dependence on labor
is low i.e. if:
El0  (R  eUk
Hh(pI   w0))
2
pI   w0 =[
Uk + Hx(pI   w0)
Uk + Hh(pI   w0) ] = G (say)
In this case the elites realize that reelection is a powerful enough tool to inuence the govern-
ment into exerting e¤ort into ensuring good property rights. Thus there is a high probability that
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investment will get attracted and consequently wages will rise. The expected wage in the province
is now given by:
we = w0 +
Hh
rmax
Z rmax
0
(w(r)  w0)dr
= w0 +Hh
(pI   w0)
2
= w0 + w
where w = Hh (pI w0)2 is the expected increase in wages. Facing these wages, the elitesproblem
of choosing the optimal technology is the same as (9), with we replacing w0: Thus the elite will
choose to modernize to a labor-saving technology only if:
w0 +Hh
(pI   w0)
2
> 4cF (1  )2 (10)
IA: Democratic success and modernization by the elite. The left-hand side of (10) is increasing
in the initial wage w0; while the right-hand side is a constant. It thus implies that it is in regions
where the initial wage is already fairly high, as well as where the returns from investment I are
large, that modernization is likely to take place, especially if the marginal and xed costs of doing
so, c and F; are not too high. In this case, the advent of democratic elections results in large-scale
change on multiple dimensions: governance is no longer captured by the elite, property rights
for outside investors improve and as a result, investment takes place and wage-income for the
masses increase; at the same time, the elite also invest in modernizing their technology, thereby
also eliminating their need to inuence government policy on this front.
IB : Democratic success and traditional elite. On the other hand, if (10) fails, the elite remain
traditional, but the introduction of a democratic political process removes both their de facto and
de jure political power and they do not pose any threat to good governance. These cases are
depicted in gure 2 below.
The pattern described above, wherein the introduction of democratic elections set in motion a
process of institution building and economic progress has often been observed. With the collapse
of the Soviet Union, free and fair elections in much of Eastern Europe be it Poland, the Czech
republic, Slovenia or Hungary were su¢ cient to economically transform these regions. However,
despite these and other instances of success, such instances of institution building are relatively
infrequent.
Case II (Resistant elites): More common is the scenario where free and fair elections coexist
with elite capture. Here the introduction of elections results in a supercial change in power,
but at a more fundamental level (bad) institutions persist. Government policy continues to serve
minority elite interests and the majority groups incomes remain low.
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This situation arises when bmin < bmax i.e. where the inequality (8) holds. Here the incumbent
leaders incentives arising from the electoral process are too weak (represented by a low bmin)
or the interests of the elite are too strong (as indicated by a high bmax) so that the elite still
maintain de facto control over the governments policy process. However, maintaining political
control comes at a cost to the elite. While the elite have the capability to ensure a low level of
property rights in the province (thereby de facto keeping out investment) by using a bribe bmin
to inuence all incumbent governments, this is also the cost for them of continuing with a labor-
intensive technology. What if they instead adopted a technology that was less dependent on labor
and thus less dependent on the need to enforce a low level of property rights?
In their calculation of gains from modernization, elites take into account the additional gain
from not having to bribe the elected government i.e. they choose l1 to maximize
(l0 l1)w0  bminE
1   
c(l0  l1)2 F . Their optimal choice for this problem is given by l1 = l0  we2c(1 ) : Two questions
arise in whether the elites would in fact wish to choose such modernization: one, at this level l1;
is it no longer in their interest to bribe the government to put in e¤ort e = 0 at good governance?
and two, are their total gains from modernization positive? The rst question is determined by
whether the inequality (8) is satised at this level l1 i.e. whether El1  G? For the second question,
the elitesgains from modernization here are given by:
Vmodern   Vtrad. = max
l1
w0l0 +
bmin
E   wel1
1     c(l0   l1)
2   F
=
bmin   El0w
E(1  ) +
(we)2
4c(1  )2   F
IIA: Democratic success with initially resistant elites. If El1  G or equivalently if El0 
G+ Ew
e
c(1 ) and the gain Vmodern   Vtrad. is positive, the elite will choose to modernize by choosing
a labor-saving technology with l1 = l0   we2c(1 ) and thereby implicitly commit to not inuencing
the government. In this case, structural changes, when they take place, are multidimensional
and dramatic: the elites modernize and democracy also thrives, as governments put in e¤ort into
enforcing property rights, investment occurs, wages rise and thus welfare of the general population
improves.
IIB : Democratic Failure and Institutional Persistence. On the other hand if El1  G, but
Vmodern   Vtrad. is non-positive, the high xed costs of changing their traditional technology mean
that the elites do not nd it worthwhile to execute that change. Consequently, the province
remains stuck with elites employing a traditional technology and aiming to keep control of the
government in order to retain their monopoly level of rents from employing labor at low wages.
Interestingly, in this case, if the elites were to modernize, their choice of technology l1 would
26
obviate their need to inuence the government. Thus, the major bottleneck in this case are the
xed costs of reorganization F: Therefore policies aimed at subsidizing F could thus indirectly
e¤ect change by making it easier for the elites to modernize.
Left to their own devices, perhaps many nascent democracies would be vulnerable to elite
capture and stuck with a low income. Realizing this, external policymakers have often attempted
to co-opt elites in a countrys nation building. Consider the ongoing nation building experiment
in Afghanistan. A signicant portion of the traditional elite obtains its revenue from opium
production and smuggling. Not surprisingly, this group has little interest in improving institutions
to promote the rule of law. Aware of this, much of recent developmental e¤orts are aimed at giving
these landowners and opium producers incentives to switch production to other crops and engage
in other economic activity (Goodson, 2005).
IIC : Democratic Failure and Elite entrenchment. Lastly consider the case when El1 > G. In
this case, even if the elites were to choose a less labor-intensive technology, even at the new level l1;
they would still wish to (and nd it feasible to) inuence the government into not enacting a good
standard of property rights protection. This is the case when either the elites are so entrenched
in a labor-intensive technology (i.e. l0 is very high so that l1 = l0   we2c(1 ) is still high) that even
with modernization they still are signicantly dependent on labor, and/or the electoral incentives
of the government are very poor. This is the situation which is likely to see the most persistence
in traditional ine¢ cient institutions. Here, although there is a change in the de facto political
process, nothing changes in terms of economic outcomes for the general populace. It is also the
situation which is perhaps the most di¢ cult to rectify and would require both developmental
policy to raise  and thereby improve the governments incentives, as well as subsidies for the
marginal cost c of adoption of labor-saving technology by the elites in order to signicantly reduce
their dependence on labor.
Of course, depending on the degree of the elitesentrenchment, it is possible that only forcible
modernization of the elite or removing their source of monopoly rents is necessary for democracy
to work. In practice, this would require the external policymaker to use some kind of coercive
policy which results in a large scale redistribution of land and other assets. The necessity of
such coercive policy is clear in many instances of nation building  from postwar Germany to
Bosnia, Kosovo and East Timor (Dobbins et al, 2003). However, perhaps the classic instance
where the use of coercive technology was necessary and successful is postwar Japan. In particular,
the military defeat of Japan had diminished the ability of the political and economic elites to
block institutional change (Kawagoe, 2000). Taking advantage of this, General MacArthur (and
policymakers at SCAP) instituted an array of policy measures so as to diminish the inuence of the
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traditional sources of power. First, they attempted to breakup the hold of the traditional zaibatsu
holding companies - eighty three of the leading zaibatsu were broken up into their component
parts and anti monopoly laws were passed to prevent their reestablishment(Dobbins et al, 2003).
Further, labor was given the right to organize into unions, to bargain collectively and to strike.
Contemporaneously, MacArthur helped push through the most sweeping land reform bill through
the Japanese Diet and oversaw its implementation. Clearly to General MacArthur, establishment
of a vibrant democracy meant tackling the economic and political roots of traditional elites.14
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we analyze a model of endogenous institutional quality where the governments ini-
tiative on improving institutions is subject to competing pressures from the electorate on one side
and the traditional elite on the other. In this context, examining the role of policy intervention in
e¤ecting institutional change, we identify two e¤ects of developmental policies. One, the incentive
e¤ect: by enhancing political accountability, they may encourage nascent democratic governments
to invest in good institutions. Two, the political control e¤ect: such developmental policies may
also increase the incentive of the rentier elite to tighten their grip on political institutions. Ac-
cordingly, we argue that successful policy intervention requires good knowledge of local conditions
because if the political control e¤ect dominates, then even a well-intentioned developmental policy
can result in an overall deterioration of institutional quality. Such policies also provide an indirect
incentive for the elite to modernize and in essence bring their interests in line with those of the
majority. In some cases, development policy coupled with subsidizing the elitesmodernization
e¤orts can result in dramatic improvements in institutional quality and welfare.
However, we should emphasize that our simple framework explored only the broad contours
of the impact of policy interventions in bringing about institutional change. There are several
facets of our framework that warrant future exploration. First, the identity/objectives of the
external/internal agent who facilitates institution building will in many instances be important.
Information about such factors as the agents credibility, preferences, ability, resource constraints
etc. are likely to play an important role in the elitesdecisions, both in the level of the bribe they
o¤er as well as their choice of whether or not to modernize. Second, our analysis has focused on
14That institutional change was rmly on his mind is clear from General MacArthurs press release on the day of
the bills passage: ...one of the most important milestones yet by Japan in the creation of an economically stable
and politically democratic society. It marks the beginning of the end of an outmoded agricultural system...These
can be no rmer foundation for a sound and moderate democracy and no rmer bulwark against the pressure of an
extreme philosophy(quoted in Kawagoe, 2000).
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a single region/province. In the case of multiple regions, how would success/failure in one region
impact the prospects for institution building in other region(s)? Third, we have assumed the elites
here to be monolithic. How would inequality among them a¤ect the equilibrium? In the context of
policy intervention, it would be of interest to study whether a policy of subsidy aimed at a specic
subgroup of elites maybe enough to change the equilibrium towards one with good institutions.
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5 Appendix: Proof of Proposition 2
The rst part of the proposition is already derived in the text. To prove the second part, let us
rewrite (7) as:
["R+ ("+ (1  "))(HZ   e2)]  e1
qinv
+M(1 + (1  "))1 + H("+ (1  "))
1 + (1  ") + "qinv (11)
where qinv = Hh: The left-hand side of the inequality is increasing in : To analyze the behavior
of the right-hand side, let us di¤erentiate it with respect to  :
  e1
2Hh
+M(1 + (1  "))(1 + (1  "))("+ (1  "))  "h
[1 + (1  ") + "qinv]2 (12)
The rst term of this derivative is negative. The sign of the second term is determined by (1 +
(1   "))(" + (1   "))   "h: This is concave in " and thus achieves its minimum at one of the
extremes " = 0 or " = 1: In both these cases, the expression is positive implying that it is positive
for all " 2 [0; 1]
Returning to the derivative of the right-hand side of (11) as given by (12), it is negative at 
close to 0 (as the negative rst term dominates in that case), and then changes sign and becomes
positive beyond a certain level of  i.e. the right-hand side of (11) is U-shaped in ; as shown in
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gure 3. The left-hand side is increasing in : Thus, either for very small or very large values of 
does the right-hand side of (11) exceed the left-hand side, and thus only in those regions does the
equilibrium involve e¤ective bribing by the elite.
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